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ABSTRACT
Does national market size matter for industrial structure? Round One (Krugman) answered in
the aﬃrmative: Home market eﬀects matter. Round Two (Davis) refuted this, arguing that an
assumption of convenience–transport costs only for the diﬀerentiated goods–conveniently obtained
the result. In Round Three we relax another persistent assumption of convenience–two industry
types diﬀerentiated only by the degree of scale economies–and ﬁnd that market size reemerges as
a relevant force in determining industrial structure.
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Science Foundation.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A famous result due to Krugman (1980) is that increasing returns industries will tend to
concentrate production within large markets. If a large country begins to trade with a
small country, the large country will shift its industrial structure towards the production of
increasing return type goods and export these to the small country. The small country,
in turn, will shift its structure towards constant return type goods and export these to the
large country. For example, if trade barriers are reduced between a small country such as
New Zealand and a large country such as Japan, New Zealand will shift away from a scale-
economy industry such as autos towards a constant returns sector such as wool. Krugman’s
result is important because the success of an economy is thought to be related, in part, to
its industrial mix; New Zealand is unlikely to be rich completely specializing in wool.
In a recent AER paper, Davis (1998) reports a striking ﬁnding that overturns Krug-
man’s result. In the original Krugman theory, transportation cost is assumed to be positive
for the increasing returns sector and zero for the scale economy sector. The absence of
transportation cost for the constant returns sector was regarded as an innocuous simplifying
assumption. Davis shows ﬁrst that this is an implausible assumption to make and, second,
without this assumption Krugman’s result is overturned. He shows that when transporta-
tion cost is the same for the two sectors, trade has no eﬀect on a country’s production mix
between scale economy and constant returns sectors. To illustrate, consider the example of
New Zealand and Japan and assume (somewhat implausibly) that there are no diﬀerences in
Ricardian comparative advantage between the two countries or diﬀerences in factor propor-
tions. The only diﬀerence is country size. Suppose the transportation cost of shipping wool
is as high as the cost of shipping automobiles and automobile parts (which seems plausible).
Then opening up trade will not lead New Zealand to shift production from autos to wool;
there is no shift in the small country towards the constant returns sector.
This paper is a third round on the issue, and our results breathe new life into Krugman’s
original ﬁndings. We ﬁnd that a seemingly innocuous simplifying aspect of the Davis model
is actually crucial. Davis assumes there are two types of industries: one type is pure
constant returns to scale and the other type has a ﬁx e dd e g r e eo fs c a l ee c o n o m i e s . R a t h e r
1than have two industry types, our model allows for a range of industry types that vary in
the degree of scale economies. We follow Davis in assuming that the transportation cost is
the same across industries. We ﬁnd that industries with a low degree of scale economies
are never traded, consistent with the Davis result that the constant returns sector is not
traded. Goods with a medium and high degree of increasing returns are traded. Our key
result is that the pattern of trade here does depend on country size, just like the original
Krugman result. The small country exports the medium increasing-returns products, the
large country exports the high increasing-returns products. Think about food processing as
having moderate increasing-returns as opposed to wool (constant returns) and autos (high
increasing returns). We ﬁnd that opening of trade between New Zealand and Japan causes
New Zealand to shift production into food processing out of autos, to export food processing
and import autos, all the while leaving the wool sector alone.
To allow for variations in the degree of scale economies across industries, we are forced
to step out of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, the workhorse
model of this literature. This structure features a ﬁxed cost and constant marginal cost.
In the zero proﬁt equilibrium, ﬁxed costs as a share of revenues equals the markup share
of price. This share depends upon the elasticity of demand but is independent of the
technology parameters. Thus, increasing the ﬁxed cost in a particular industry has no eﬀect
in increasing the equilibrium ﬁxed cost share in that industry; the share remains constant.
In fact, in the benchmark case where demand for ﬁnal (composite) goods is Cobb-Douglas,
a change in the ﬁxed cost parameter of a particular industry has zero eﬀect in all countries
on the equilibrium allocation of inputs across industries.1 A particular concern is that as
the ﬁxed cost parameter goes to zero, there is no sense in which the outcome gets close to
the constant returns case. It is plainly the case that varying the ﬁxed cost parameter in the
Dixit-Stiglitz world is not an interesting exercise.
We develop a structure to conduct our analysis that departs in two ways from the standard
1If the ﬁxed cost doubles in an industry, in the new equilibrium there are half as many ﬁrms in that
industry in each country as before and each ﬁrm produces twice as much output. Thus zero proﬁti s
maintained. The Cobb-Douglas assumption leaves industry revenue ﬁxed, so the market clearing condition
continues to hold.
2Dixit-Stiglitz world. First, the set of possible diﬀerentiated products is ﬁxed and as a result
there may be multiple entry, i.e., oligopoly, for any particular product. (With Dixit-Stiglitz
there is at most one producer of each product.) Second, while the technology features an
initial range of increasing returns, there exists a ﬁnite minimum eﬃcient scale beyond which
average cost is constant. (With Dixit-Stiglitz there is a ﬁxed cost and constant marginal cost
so the minimum eﬃcient scale is inﬁnity.) These two departures from the standard analysis
complement each other; i.e., once we have made the ﬁrst departure it helps considerably to
make the second departure as well. The assumption that constant returns are reached at
a large enough scale implies that in large markets the perfect competition outcome can be
sustained. This allows for a structure that is quite tractable but rich enough to capture the
importance of scale economies in small markets, given the initial range of increasing returns
to scale.
In our model, products vary in the minimum eﬃcient scale of production. Our question is
how the structure of production and trade varies with a product’s degree of scale economies.
We begin our analysis by rederiving Krugman’s and Davis’ results in a special case of our
alternative formulation. In this special case, industries can be one of two minimum eﬃcient
scale types. The ﬁrst type all have minimum eﬃcient scale equal to zero, i.e. constant
returns. The second type all have a minimum eﬃcient scale equal to an identical high
level. For the Krugman case, we assume transportation cost is zero for the constant returns
industry. We show that when a small country trades with a large country, the small country
tends to specialize in the constant returns sector, while the large country specializes in the
increasing returns goods. Thus we rederive Krugman’s home market result, though there are
some subtleties as we discuss in the main text. For the Davis case, we assume transportation
cost is equal for the two sectors. We rederive Davis’ result that there is no trade in the
constant returns sector. All trade is in the increasing returns sector. Reductions in trade
barriers have no eﬀect on the structure of production.
The main body of our analysis considers the general case where there is a continuum of
industry types ranging from zero minimum eﬃcient scale to high minimum eﬃcient scale.
We ﬁnd that the equilibrium with trade is characterized by two cutoﬀs, dividing industries
into low, medium, and high returns to scale. Goods with low minimum eﬃcient scale are
3not traded. Goods in the high minimum eﬃcient scale range are not produced in the small
country. The small country pays for imports of high range goods with exports of medium
range goods. A reduction in the trade barrier reduces the range of goods produced in the
small country.
This paper holds the transportation cost ﬁxed and varies the degree of scale economies.
Amiti (1998) uses the standard Dixit-Stiglitz structure to consider what happens when sec-
tors vary in transportation cost but are identical in scale economies (and product diﬀeren-
tiation). She shows that the small country tends to specialize in goods with low transport
costs.2 In a related paper (Holmes and Stevens, 2002), we use a variant of the model in
this paper to further explore the eﬀects of diﬀerences in transportation costs alone on the
structure of production.
2T h e M o d e l
We begin by describing the environment and then deﬁne equilibrium.
2.1 The Environment
There is a continuum of industries indexed by i on the unit interval, i ∈ [0,1].L e t q(i)




ln(q(˜ ı))d˜ ı. (1)
Labor is the only input in production. The production technology across industries varies













for a parameter α ∈ [1
2,1).3 The parameter θ is the minimum eﬃcient scale of the industry.
2She also considers other comparisons, such as what happens when the small country and the large
country diﬀer in factor composition.
3The qualitative results hold for α ∈ (0, 1
2) as well, but restricting attention to α ≥ 1
2 simpliﬁes by
reducing the range of cases that need to be considered.
4For q above θ, average cost and marginal cost are constant at one labor unit. For q below
θ, average cost is greater than one unit and falling while marginal cost is less than one and
rising. For example, in the case where α = 1






















We motivate this formulation of the technology by an indivisibility. Suppose that in
every industry labor must be used to complete two tasks. Let `1 and `2 denote the amount
















With this technology, the cost minimizing way to produce q units of output requires q units
of labor, with a share α allocated to task 1 and a share 1 − α allocated to task 2. Suppose
there is an indivisibility constraint that
`1 ≥ αθ.( 4 )
Then for q>θ, the constraint is not binding and cost per unit is one labor unit. But for
q<θ, the constraint is binding. The ﬁrm has to employ αθ units in task 1 even though it
would prefer to use less. The ﬁrst term of the cost function (2) is this ﬁxed cost of the units
employed at task 1. The second term is the variable cost of the units employed at task 2.
While industries all have the same α,t h e yv a r yi nθ.L e t θ(i) denote the minimum
eﬃcient scale in industry i.L e t f(θ) denote the density of industries of type θ in the




There are two countries, one small and one large. Let L be total labor in the small
country and L∗ be total labor in the large country.
5There is an iceberg transportation cost to ship goods from one country to the other.
Assume that for industry i, τ(i) ≥ 1 units must be shipped for every one unit that arrives.
The main focus will be the case where τ is constant across i and strictly greater than 1.
2.2 Equilibrium
Let w be the wage in the small country and let Π be the aggregate proﬁt arising from all
ﬁrms located in the small country. Then income in the small country is
I = wL+ Π.
Analogously deﬁne income I∗ in the large country. Let A ≡ (w,I,w∗,I∗) denote the set of
aggregate variables.
The structure of behavior in this model is a combination of competition and oligopoly.
All individuals are small relative to the economy as a whole so they take the aggregate
variables in A as ﬁxed. Within any given industry, prices are set by oligopolist ﬁrms who
take the aggregate variables A as given. Since demand in each industry is unit elastic, prices
set in other industries do not matter for the behavior of this industry, so the vector A with
wages and aggregate income is all that is needed.
There is a two stage game that is played in every industry i.I n s t a g e 1 , ﬁrms simultane-
ously make entry decisions. Let ni and n∗
i be the number of ﬁrms in industry i that commit
to locating in the small and large countries. At the point of entry, ﬁrms commit themselves
to satisfying the indivisibility constraint, `1 ≥ αθ(i).I n s t a g e 2 , ﬁrms simultaneously set
prices, competing in a Bertrand fashion.
Our discussion of equilibrium has three parts. First we discuss the equilibrium of stage 2,
the price-setting stage. Next we discuss the equilibrium of stage 1, the entry stage. Finally,
we discuss the economy-wide equilibrium.
2.2.1 The Price-Setting Stage
In stage 2, the entry decisions (n,n∗) have already been determined (To simplify notation,
the subscript for industry i is implicit here). Firms observe entry as well as the aggregate
variables A ≡ (w,I,w∗,I∗). Firms can price discriminate and set a diﬀerent price in each
6market. Let pL and pE be the local and export prices set by a ﬁrm in the small country.
The delivered export price is τpE.L e t qL and qE denote a small country ﬁrm’s output for
the local and export markets and let q = qL + qE be the total output. Analogously deﬁne
pL∗, pE∗, qL∗, qE∗,a n dq∗ for a ﬁrm in the large country.
We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria where ﬁrms that locate in the same industry
and the same country behave symmetrically. The price set by any given ﬁrm in stage 2
must maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, taking as given the prices set by the other ﬁrms and the
aggregate variables. In a separate appendix available on the web we show the following
about equilibrium in the price subgame.4
Lemma 1 Given any A and entry vector (n,n∗), a symmetric equilibrium to the price sub-
game exists. If there are at least two ﬁrms in a given country, n ≥ 2 or n∗ ≥ 2,t h e r ei sa
unique symmetric equilibrium of the price subgame. If each location has a single ﬁrm, n =1
and n∗ =1 , and if there is an equilibrium with trade, then it has a unique equilibrium.
When n =1and n∗ =1 , there may exist a continuum of equilibria with no trade. For
this case take some arbitrary equilibrium selection. For all other cases, the symmetric
equilibrium is unique. Let π(n,n∗) and π∗(n,n∗) denote proﬁts for a ﬁrm in the small and
large country. Note these are implicitly functions of the industry i and the aggregate vector
A. It is immediate that
π(1,0) = I + I
∗
π(n,n
∗) ≤ 0, n ≥ 2.
To understand the ﬁrst statement, observe that if a ﬁrm has a monopoly in the small country
and it has no competitor in the large country, it can extract the entire industry revenue as
proﬁt by making the price arbitrarily large (recall demand is unit elastic). To understand
the second statement, observe that if there are two ﬁrms at the same location, Bertrand
competition drives price equal to marginal cost, which is no greater than average cost, so
proﬁts must be non-positive.
4The appendix can be accessed at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/research.html.
72.2.2 The Entry Stage
Turn now to stage 1. In an equilibrium, all entrants receive nonnegative proﬁta n dt h e r ei s





with analogous conditions on proﬁts holding in the large country. Note these conditions do
not require that there be zero proﬁt in all industries. If an industry has positive proﬁts as
a monopoly but has negative proﬁts as a duopoly, the industry will have positive proﬁts in
equilibrium.
In general there may be multiple equilibria in the entry game. To see this, consider a
simple case where there is only a single country. If one ﬁrm enters it has a monopoly and
it extracts the income I.I f t w o ﬁrms enter, price is driven to marginal cost. Suppose the
country is large enough so that the output of both ﬁrms exceeds the minimum eﬃcient scale.
Monopoly is an equilibrium here because if a second ﬁrm enters, it has zero proﬁt, so there is
no strict positive incentive to enter. But duopoly is also an equilibrium because both ﬁrms
earn zero proﬁt. For analogous reasons, there can be multiple equilibria to the entry game
with two countries. In cases of multiple equilibria, we prefer to focus on equilibria where
entry forces proﬁts to zero. Hence we use the following elimination criterion.
Elimination Criterion 1. Suppose there is an equilibrium (n,n∗) to the entry game such
that π(n,n∗) > 0. Suppose also that π(n +1 ,n ∗)=0and π∗(n +1 ,n ∗) ≥ 0, which implies
that (n+1,n ∗) is an equilibrium. Eliminate (n,n∗) from the set of equilibria to the subgame.
Even among the set of equilibria where all ﬁrms obtain zero proﬁt, there may exist
multiple equilibria which diﬀer by price. In particular, if I∗ is large enough, if I is small
enough, and if τw∗ ≤ w, then we can construct an equilibrium with multiple ﬁrms in one
location and none in the other, as well as a second equilibrium where this is reversed. These
equilibria can be Pareto ranked. We eliminate the Pareto inferior equilibrium.
Elimination Criterion 2. Suppose there are two equilibria (n,n∗) and (˜ n, ˜ n∗) to the entry
game and that all proﬁts are zero in both. If all consumers weakly prefer (˜ n, ˜ n∗),a n ds o m e
consumers strictly prefer it, then eliminate (n,n∗) from the set of equilibria to the subgame.
8In our deﬁnition of equilibrium to the entry game, we restrict attention to equilibria that
are not eliminated by criterion 1 or 2.
2.2.3 Economy-Wide Equilibrium
W et u r nn o wt oad e ﬁnition of equilibrium for the economy as a whole. It consists of a list
of aggregate variables A =( w,I,w∗,I∗) and entry decisions (ni,n ∗
i) for each industry i,a n d








i ) such that:
(1) Consumer demand maximizes utility.
(2) Given A, the entry and pricing decisions are a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
oligopoly game that are not eliminated by criterion 1 or 2.
(3) The income taken as given for the oligopoly games equals the total income in the
economy, I = wL + Π and I∗ = wL∗ + Π∗.
(4) Supply equals demand in the labor market.
3 The Krugman and Davis Results
This section rederives the results in the literature for our alternative model. Instead of
having a continuum of diﬀerent industries, we follow the earlier literature by having two
industry types, type a (agriculture) and type m (manufacturing). Assume that θa =0and
that θm > 0. Thus, agricultural industries have constant returns to scale while there is
a range of increasing returns with manufacturing industries. Suppose that all industries
i ∈ [0,f a] are type a and all industries i ∈ (fa,1] are type m. Therefore, a fraction fa of
industries are type a and a fraction fm =1− fa are type m.L e t τa and τm denote the
iceberg transportation cost parameter for each industry.
3.1 Round 1: Krugman
In the Krugman case there is no transportation cost for agricultural goods so τa =1 .
Manufacturers do have a transportation cost so τm > 1. We derive conditions under
which a Krugman-like result is obtained in which the small country completely specializes
in agriculture.
9Proposition 1 Suppose (i) L<θm
2 , (ii) L∗ > 2θm, and (iii) fmL<f aL∗. Then there
exists an equilibrium such that
• w = w∗ =1 .
• n∗(i)=2 , for all i. (There is multiple entry in the large country for all goods.)
• n(i)=2 ,f o ri ∈ [0,f a], n(i)=0 ,f o ri ∈ (fa,1]. (In the small country, there is




• pa =1 , pm = τm.
Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that the small country is suﬃciently small and that the
large country is suﬃciently large. Condition (iii) ensures that agriculture is a large enough
share of the budget to make it possible for the small country to completely specialize in
agriculture. (Note that if we were to assume fa ≥ 1
2, then (i) and (ii) would imply (iii).)
We sketch the proof. The agricultural sector is constant returns. Given duopoly entry
for all agricultural products in both countries, Bertrand competition ensures price equals
marginal cost. Given duopoly entry for all manufacturing products in the large country,
price equals marginal cost there as well. The assumption L∗ > 2θm guarantees that the
two ﬁrms will produce above minimum eﬃcient scale, so marginal cost will equal 1 and that
will equal the price. The large country is in a constant returns world and its prices are
unaﬀected by trade with the small country. Consumers face a price of 1 for both kinds of
goods. Consumers in the small country pay 1 for the agricultural goods but have to pay τm
to import manufactured goods.
The only thing that remains to be checked is the proﬁtability of entry by a manufacturing









10The ﬁrst equality follows from the Cobb-Douglas assumption; the second substitutes in I = L
(wage is 1 and there are no proﬁt s )a n dt h ef a c tt h a tpL = τm (since the ﬁrm will limit price,
matching the delivered import price). In the export market, the entrant would set an export
price of pE = 1
τm, so that with transport costs it would match the price oﬀered by the local
ﬁrms in the large country. At this price, the entrant could choose to export any quantity qE
that did not exceed τL∗.( L∗ is the local demand in the large country at the local price of
one; if the small-country ﬁrm exports τL∗ units then L∗ units are delivered.) The problem
of an entrant is




















Note that even though the export price is less than the minimum average cost of 1, the entrant
still might want to export because its marginal cost will be less than 1. But condition (i),
L<θm
2 ,i sas u ﬃcient condition for the maximized proﬁt to be strictly negative, so there is
no incentive to enter. It is clear that proﬁt will be negative if L is small. When the local
market is close to zero, virtually all the entrant’s revenues will come from exports. But the
export price is below minimum average cost, so the entrant cannot break even with exports
alone.
Proposition 1 conﬁrms the Krugman intuition for this model when a small country is
paired up with a large county. A subtlety arises when a medium size country is paired with
a large country. Here a reversal is possible. We illustrate this with an example. The smaller
of the two countries will be called the “medium” country because the size is intermediate
between θm
2 and θm.
Example. Suppose the parameters are such that
1. θm
2 <L<θm,
















11Then there exists an equilibrium where the medium size country completely specializes in
manufacturing, and the wage in the medium country exceeds the wage in the large country,
w>w ∗. A subset of the manufactured products are produced in the medium country by
a monopolist (i.e. n(i)=1for i in some subset of (fa,1]). The remaining manufactured
products are not produced in the medium country, nor are agricultural products produced,
n(i)=0 , i ∈ [0,f a]. The large country has duopoly producers for all goods.
In this example, there are monopoly producers of manufactured goods in the medium
country, but they get zero proﬁt (the wage goes above 1 to drive this proﬁtt oz e r o ) . T h e
medium country exports some manufactured goods and imports the other manufactured
goods, as well as all the agricultural goods. It is easy to understand why this happens.
As we increase L, the size of the smaller country, eventually there will be production of
some manufactured goods in the smaller country. But for a medium size country, the local
demand might be on the short side. By exporting, the medium size country can get to
eﬃcient scale. This does not adversely aﬀect producers in the large country because they
are already well above eﬃcient scale.
3.2 Round 2: Davis
Davis considers the case where agricultural and manufactured goods have the same trans-
portation cost, τa = τm = τ > 1. He shows in his model that there can never be equilibrium
trade in agricultural goods. The intuition of his result is quite simple. Suppose the small
country were to export agricultural goods to the large country. The small country must
then have the lowest cost to produce the agricultural good, i.e., τw ≤ w∗. Since the large
country imports agricultural goods, and because there can be no two-way trade in agricul-
ture, it must be that the large country is exporting manufactured goods. But now suppose
a manufacturer from the large country shifts production to the small country. The costs
of serving the consumers in the large country will not increase, since the wage advantage
more than compensates for the additional transportation costs. But the costs of serving
consumers in the small country go down because of the wage advantage and the fact that
transport costs are now avoided. So proﬁt strictly increases, contradicting the optimality of
the manufacturer locating in the large country.
12Extending his result to our model involves some complications because our technology
is diﬀerent and because we have an oligopoly for any particular diﬀerentiated product as
opposed to monopoly. Nonetheless, the same basic argument applies here. We state our
formal proposition here and relegate the proof to the separate appendix.
Proposition 2 With equal transportation costs, τa = τm = τ > 1, there is no equilibrium
under the Pareto dominance selection criterion with trade in agricultural goods. In both
countries, the labor share in manufacturing equals fm, so the industrial structure is the
same.
4 Round 3: The Continuum Model
We now return to our general model with a continuum of industry types θ.F r o m t h e
discussion of the Krugman model, we know that complications arise when the two countries
are relatively close in size (recall the discussion of the case where a medium sized country
trades with a large country).
To sharpen the analysis we focus on the case where the smaller country is quite small,





Under this bound, the total labor in the small country is insuﬃcient to pay the ﬁxed cost of
opening positive production in all of the industries. The lower bound on the large country
size is
L
∗ > 3θ.( 7 )
This assumption implies that the large country is big enough without trade to support three
ﬁrms above minimum eﬃcient scale in all the industries. By making the market big enough
for three ﬁrms, we ensure that if there is a ﬁrm in the small country producing the good,
there is still suﬃcient demand in the large country to support two ﬁrms (which we want to
sustain the Bertrand outcome in the large country).
13Deﬁne a Large Country Perfect Competition Equilibrium to be one where n∗
i =2for all
industries i;i . e . ,t h e r ea r et w oﬁrms represented in every industry in the large country. In
this section we restrict attention to equilibria in this class.
Proposition 3 There exists a Large Country Perfect Competition Equilibrium. This equi-
librium is characterized by autarchy in goods with low scale economies; small country exports
in goods with intermediate scale economies; and large country exports in goods with high scale
economies.
The analysis underlying our proposition has two parts. First, we characterize how the
market structure (number of ﬁrms) varies with θ. Second, we show how the trade structure
varies with θ. Below we sketch our argument and put the formal proof in the appendix.
4.1 Market Structure
The market structure in the small country is characterized by two cutoﬀs, ˆ θ1 < ˆ θ0.F o r
industries with θ below ˆ θ1 there are two ﬁrms setting price equal to marginal cost a la
Bertrand. Industries between ˆ θ1 and ˆ θ0 have a single ﬁrm. Industries above ˆ θ0 have zero
ﬁrms. The cutoﬀs are illustrated in Figure 1.
Our formal characterization of the equilibrium market structure proceeds in four steps.
These steps characterize the market structure and show the existence of an equilibrium.
Step one is the observation that, in any equilibrium, the small-country wage w satisﬁes







The intuition for these bounds follows the discussion of the Davis result in Section 3.2.
Step two takes the aggregate state A =( w,I,w∗,I∗) as given and determines the equi-
librium to the oligopoly game for each type of industry θ. W eh a v es e tw∗ =1as the
numeraire. In a Large Country Perfect Competition Equilibrium there are zero proﬁts in
the large country so total income there is wage income, I∗ = L∗. Since the small country
income equals I = wL+Π, we can represent the aggregate state by (w,Π), the small country
wage and the small country aggregate proﬁt.
14Let π(θ,w,Π) be the proﬁt of a monopolist in the small country given the industry scale
parameter θ and the aggregate state (w,Π). Analogous to the earlier formula (5), it equals
local revenues plus export revenues minus total cost at the optimum export level,











It is immediate that π is nonincreasing in the scale parameter θ.D e ﬁne ˆ θ0(w,Π) to be the
maximum level of θ such that π(w,Π) ≥ 0.P r o ﬁt is negative for θ above ˆ θ0(w,Π) so there








At this point, when there are two entrants, the equilibrium output of each ﬁrm with Bertrand
competition exactly equals minimum eﬃcient scale. For θ less than ˆ θ1,t w oﬁrms enter in
equilibrium. For θ between ˆ θ1 and ˆ θ0 as i n g l eﬁrm enters.
T h et h i r ds t e ps o l v e sf o rt h ev a l u eo fa g g r e g a t ep r o ﬁts Π as a function of the wage rate,
taking into account that entry depends upon Π. Speciﬁcally, Π(w) solves H (Π,w)=0
where




We show in the separate appendix that for any w in the relevant range (8), there is a unique
solution.
The fourth step is to solve for the wage rate in the small country that clears the labor





where q(θ,w) is the quantity of type θ good produced given wage w and proﬁt Π(w).I n t h e
appendix we show that E(w) is strictly positive near the lower bound of w = 1
τ and strictly
negative near the upper bound of w = τ; continuity ensures that an equilibrium wage exists.
Finally, note that in equilibrium ˆ θ0 < θ since otherwise assumption (6) would imply the
resource constraint is violated.
154.2 Trade Structure
The equilibrium trade structure is characterized by two cutoﬀs, ˆ θE and ˆ θ0.T h e c u t o ﬀ ˆ θ0 is
t h es a m ec u t o ﬀ from above that separates the single-ﬁrm entry and zero entry cases. The
cutoﬀ ˆ θE satisﬁes ˆ θE ≥ ˆ θ1 and ˆ θE < ˆ θ0. For industries θ < ˆ θE there is no trade. For
industries in the range θ ∈ (ˆ θE,ˆ θ0) the small country producers all export. For industries
θ > ˆ θ0, there is no production in the small country and all the small country demand is met
by imports. These cutoﬀs are illustrated in Figure 1.
Recall that for θ < ˆ θ1, there are two producers in the small country and both ﬁrms
produce in the constant-returns-to-scale region of the production function. There is no
trade in these goods following the original Davis argument. The price of such goods in the
small country equals w, minimum average cost. Since the equilibrium wage w lies between
w∗
τ and τw∗, there is no scope for trade.
For θ between ˆ θ0 and θ, there are no producers in the small country. So demand is met
by imports.
Now consider the range between ˆ θ1 and ˆ θ0 w h e r et h e r ei sas i n g l ep r o d u c e ri nt h es m a l l
country. Examining the ﬁrm’s problem (9), the ﬁrm will choose to export if the export price






for qL = wL+Π
τ .F o r θ <q L, marginal cost is constant in θ, while it decreases in θ for
qL < θ. (See equation (3).) Thus if any θ
◦ chooses to export, all θ > θ
◦ also strictly prefer
to export. Thus the export decision will have the form of a cutoﬀ where all θ above the
cutoﬀ choose positive exports. Since there is a positive measure of imports there must be a
positive measure of exports. Therefore, there must exist a cutoﬀ ˆ θE < ˆ θ0 where all θ above
ˆ θE export.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis assumes the structure of demand is the same across products and varies the
degree of scale economies across products. It is straightforward to see that analogous results
16would be obtained if the cost structure were the same across products but demand structure
were to diﬀer. In particular suppose that consumers have relatively greater demand for some
products relative to others in the sense that they would choose to buy a larger quantity at the
same price. For goods with a high enough level of demand, it might be possible even in the
small country for ﬁrms to get to the constant returns to scale region, so these goods would
not be traded, analogous to the way there is autarchy in our original model for the goods
with low minimum eﬃcient scale. Following the same logic as our original model, the small
country will tend to export goods of intermediate level of demand and import goods with
low levels of demand. One can think of the products with low level of demand as “boutique”
or “niche” items. Only the large market can sustain production of these “unusual” items.5
For the sake of tractability, we chose a production technology that features constant
returns above some minimum eﬃcient scale and we focus on the case where the large country
is suﬃciently large to have perfect competition throughout all the industries. Alternatively,
we could have conducted an analysis with a constant marginal cost and a ﬁxed cost that
varied across industries.6 With this alternative structure, there would be at most one
producer of a given product at each location, because of the usual Bertrand logic. It is
intuitive that for low ﬁxed cost products, there would be entry at both locations, so such
goods would not be traded, analogous to our results here. For higher ﬁxed cost goods,
production would be only at one location. As is typical in oligopoly games, there are
multiple equilibria in this environment regarding the country in which a given industry
locates. Thus, there is no hope that a clean partition of industry and trade structure as in
our proposition would be the equilibrium here. Nonetheless, we expect that a qualitative
aspect of our result would continue to hold. In particular, we conjecture that if the highest
ﬁxed cost is high enough and if the large country is large enough, the highest ﬁxed cost
goods would only be produced in the large country. Thus the structure of production and
trade would depend in systematic ways upon the size of the home market.
5See Holmes (1999) for a related analysis.
6If we had gone this way, we would also have assumed an elasticity of substitution between products
greater than one rather than one, to bound the optimal monopoly price.
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Figure 1: Small Country Market and Trade Structures in the Continuum Model